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Abstract
Consumers purchase conspicuous goods to satisfy not just material needs but also social needs
such as prestige. In an attempt to meet these social needs, marketing managers of conspicuous
goods like cars, perfumes, and watches employ several strategies to highlight the exclusivity of
their products. These strategies include using exclusive distribution, charging high prices, and
limiting production. Further, marketing textbooks suggest that the demand curve for prestige
goods could be upward sloping and therefore ﬁrms should not set prices which are “too low”. In
this paper we examine whether the desire for exclusivity can lead to an upward-sloping demand
curve. We also investigate how social factors such as the desire for exclusivity and conformity
affect prices and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. To analyze these issues, we develop a model of conspicuous con-
sumption using the rational expectations framework. We consider two different market structures:
monopoly and duopoly. Our results shows that the desire for exclusivity can lead to an upward-
sloping demand curve when there is a segment of consumers who are (weakly) conformists. The
impact of exclusivity and conformity on prices and proﬁts varies with the market structure. Inter-
estingly, an increase in perceived functional differentiation of products consumed by snobs could
decrease ﬁrms’ proﬁts and prices. In the laboratory, we observe an upward sloping demand curve
for snobs, in both the monopoly and duopoly setting. We also track consumer’s expectations, and
ﬁnd on average that subjects’ beliefs are consistent with the observed outcome and the rational
expectations equilibrium solution.
KEYWORDS: Game Theory, Experimental Economics, Consumer Behavior, Rational Expecta-
tions, Prestige Pricing1 Amaldoss and Jain: An Analysis of the Impact of Social Factors on Purchase Behavior
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1 Introduction
It is generally accepted in marketing that the decision to purchase a “conspicuous” product
depends not only on the material needs satisﬁed by the product, but also on social needs
such as prestige (see for example Belk 1988, Grubb and Grathwohl 1967). Recognizing
such social needs, marketers of conspicuous goods employ several strategies to highlight the
exclusivity of their product. For example, in an eﬀort to maintain its exclusive image, Ferrari
promises not to produce more than 4300 vehicles every year, despite a more than two-year
waiting list for its cars (Betts 2002). The strategy of limiting production quantity is also
practiced in categories such as coins, watches and jewelry. Alternatively, ﬁrms use exclusive
distribution channels to restrict the availability of their products. For instance, fearing
that wide availability could hurt its exclusive image, Christian Dior sued supermarkets for
carrying its products (Marketing Week, July 3, 1997).1 These strategies are in part driven
by the belief that some consumers would ﬁnd a product less valuable if it is widely available,
and that exclusivity will enable the ﬁrm to charge a high price and earn higher proﬁts.2
Indeed in marketing textbooks, it is suggested that the demand curve for prestige goods
is upward-sloping for some range and therefore ﬁrms should not price their products “too
low”(see for example, Berkowitz et al. 2000, Pereault and McCarthy 2000).
One potential sociological explanation for the upward slope in the demand curve for
prestige goods is that consumers could use these goods to impress others of their relative
wealth (Coleman 1990).3,4 However, Corneo and Jeanne (1997a) show that under a signaling
framework the desire for exclusivity always leads to a downward-sloping curve. Interestingly,
1Luxury good manufacturers are also advised not to sell their products over the internet since this will
dilute their image (Marketing, August 24, 2000).
2Research has shown that rarity of products can increase the perceived value of products even for items
such as cookies (see Worchel, Lee and Adewole 1975).
3Adam Smith says that “with the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in
the parade of riches, which in their eyes in never so complete as when they appear to possess those decisive
marks of opulence which nobody can possess but themselves (c.f. Heilbroner 1986, p. 190).
4There are two other explanations which could explain the presence of an upward-sloping demand curve.
The ﬁrst reason is that consumers use price to infer quality, especially when it is diﬃcult to determine
quality by inspection (Zikmund and d’Amico 2000, p.624). Using a signaling model, Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) show that ﬁrms might strategically use prices to help consumers make inferences about the quality of
experience goods. There is also some empirical evidence which supports the association of price and quality
(see for example Rao and Monroe 1989). The second reason is that certain goods (called “Giﬀen Goods”)
are so inferior that the income eﬀect is larger than the substitution eﬀect. In reality, the likelihood of such
goods is viewed with skepticism as the share of expenditure on a good in comparison to total spending is
likely to be so small that income eﬀect would be negligible (Hicks 1946, Heiner 1974). It is even argued that
the Giﬀen paradox will vanish, if we allow consumers to buy a price insurance (Barzel and Suen 1992). In
contrast to these approaches, our focus is on social inﬂuences on consumer demand.
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their analysis reveals that an upward-sloping demand curve can be observed only if the
consumers are followers.5 Followers are consumers who prefer to conform with the society
and derive more utility from a product if it is purchased by more people (Ross, Bierbrauer
and Hoﬀman 1976, Jones 1984). Conformism is seen in products such as garments.6
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether consumer’s desire for exclusivity can
lead to an upward-sloping demand curve. Further, we wish to examine how the optimal
prices and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are impacted by the social needs of consumers. Toward this goal,
we develop a model of conspicuous consumption using the rational expectations framework.
We capture consumers’ desire for exclusivity and conformity by allowing the utility derived
from a product to depend not only on its intrinsic value but also on consumption externality.
Consistent with the classic work of Leibenstien (1950), we model snobs as consumers whose
utility from a product decreases as more people consume the same product. For example, a
BMW in every driveway could dilute the value of the car to potential buyers (cf. Bagwell
and Bernheim 1996).7 In a similar fashion, we model followers as consumers whose utility
from a product increases as more people consume the product (see Becker 1991 for a similar
formulation).8. For instance, often teenagers view MTV because their friends watch it (Sun
and Lull 1986). We also see evidence of conformism in the purchase of books, toys and
garments.
We begin our analysis by examining a monopoly. Our analysis suggests that if the market
is comprised of only snobs then the demand curve is downward sloping, and ﬁrm’s proﬁts
decline as snobbish behavior increases. If the market is comprised of only followers, again
the stable demand curve is downward sloping, but ﬁrm’s proﬁts increase as the degree of
conformity increases. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that if the market includes both snobs and
5The intuition for the result is as follows. Consider the case where the signaling value of a good is ﬁxed. In
this situation, an increase in price must be associated with a reduction in demand. Therefore, for the demand
curve to be upward sloping the signaling value has to increase suﬃciently with increased consumption, in
order to oﬀset the classical eﬀect of price on demand. Therefore, in a signaling framework an upward sloping
demand curve is possible only when the consumers are followers (see Corneo and Jeanne (1997a) for details).
6The innate desire to conform is often used to explain the persistence of social customs. Similar arguments
are also advanced to explain participation in trade unions (Naylor and Cripps 1993), and fair wages (Romer
1984). An alternative explanation for conformism is herd behavior caused by Bayesian learning (Bikchandani
et al. 1992). See Frank (1985) for a discussion of the socio-biological bases of human needs such as desire
for exclusivity and conformity.
7See also Nagel and Holden (2002, p.92) who say that exclusivity adds to the objective value of a product.
8Leibenstein (1950) uses the term bandwagon eﬀect to describe what we call the follower-eﬀect. We prefer
to use the terms followers and conformist (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996) since bandwagon eﬀects are often
associated with adoption in large blocks (see for example Farrell and Saloner 1985).
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followers, then it is possible for the snobs to have an upward-sloping demand curve.9 We
also show that the common belief that exclusivity leads to higher prices is not always valid.
We ﬁnd some corroborating evidence for these results in an empirical study of visible status
goods purchased by women (Chao and Schor 1998).
Later we examine the implications of snobbism and conformism in the context of a
duopoly catering to two segments of consumers, namely snobs and followers. Again, the
demand curve for followers, as well as the total market, is downward sloping. Yet the demand
curve for snobs could be upward sloping. We also ﬁnd that cross-price eﬀects for snobs can be
negative. Further, in contrast to the monopoly case, we show that snobbism can actually lead
to higher prices and proﬁts. This result is consistent with some of the marketing strategies
designed to make a product exclusive. Interestingly, the degree of perceived functional
diﬀerentiation of products consumed by snobs could decrease equilibrium ﬁrm proﬁts and
prices.
Our model makes several interesting predictions, and there is some support for our results
in Chao and Shor’s study. It would be useful if we can more comprehensively test our rational
expectations model of conspicuous consumption. However, it is not easy to objectively
measure expectations in a ﬁeld setting. Consequently, it is diﬃcult to assess whether decision
makers shape their behavior on the basis of rational expectations (Leiderman 1980, Dwyer
1981, and Mishkin 1981). But in a controlled laboratory setting it is possible to track both
the behavior and beliefs of decision makers. Hence we subject our model predictions to a
laboratory test.
In Study 1, we trace the demand curve for snobs and followers in a monopoly setting. In
Study 2, we tested the predictions of our model for the duopoly case. In both studies, we
used a within-subject design with two price points so that we can trace the demand curve
for each segment of market. The experimental results are qualitatively consistent with the
model predictions for both snobs and followers. In particular, we ﬁnd that the demand of
snobs increases as price increases.
In both studies, we also tracked each individual subject’s expectation of the demand
from trial to trial. To the best of our knowledge, our empirical investigation is the ﬁrst one
to track both expectations and the outcomes in a rational expectations game (see Sunder
9In fact, we can observe an upward-sloping demand curve for snobs even if there is a segment of consumers
whose utilities are unaﬀected by consumption externalities. In other words, the result goes through if the
market is comprised of snobs and consumers who are (weakly) conformists.
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1995 for a survey of experimental research on rational expectations models). On average,
the expectations are closely aligned with the actual outcomes and the equilibrium solution.
But we see variations in the expectations of individual subjects. These two experimental
studies show that upward sloping demand curves are indeed observable among snobs, even
for products that have neither quality diﬀerences nor any signal value. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd some support for the rational expectations framework at the aggregate level.
Related Literature and Contributions. Our work is related to the literature on
conspicuous consumption. Marketing researchers have for long studied the role of products
as a means of self expression (see for example Belk 1988, Grubb and Grathwohl 1967). This
research has identiﬁed the existence two competing social needs among consumers: a need
for uniqueness and a countervailing need for similarity (Brewer 1991, Fromkin and Snyder
1980). Further, there is evidence that these two traits inﬂuence consumer choices (Lynn
1991, Snyder 1992, Simonson and Nowlis 2000). These traits form the basis of what we refer
to as the desire for exclusivity and conformity. This stream of research, however, does not
examine how these traits aﬀect the aggregate demand or ﬁrm behavior. Rather the focus is
on describing the psychological and social underpinnings of consumers’ decisions.
There is also a body of research in economics which has attempted to incorporate social
aspects in a formal economic analysis. Liebenstein (1950) drew the attention of economists
to the importance of social factors in consumption (see also Veblen 1899). Becker (1991) used
conformism to explain why similar restaurants might eventually experience vastly diﬀerent
sales pattern. He showed that in equilibrium the demand curve for followers could be upward
sloping, though the equilibrium is not stable. There are several signaling models on conspic-
uous consumption. For instance, Bernheim (1994) showed that when status is suﬃciently
important relative to intrinsic utility, then many individuals conform to a single standard of
behavior, despite heterogeneous underlying preferences. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and
Corneo and Jeanne (1997a) argued that conspicuous consumption is a consequence of the
desire of consumers to signal their wealth. However, Corneo and Jeanne (1997a) ﬁnd that
the demand curve for a conspicuous product is downward sloping for snobs. The intuition
for this result is that if more consumers buy the good, then the signal value of the good
must decrease for snobs. Consequently, the ﬁrm needs to decrease prices in order to increase
demand, implying a downward-sloping demand curve. Thus, they show that under a signal-
ing framework, snobbish behavior cannot lead to an upward-sloping demand curve. Another
5 Amaldoss and Jain: An Analysis of the Impact of Social Factors on Purchase Behavior
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 20125
stream of research which studies consumption externality is the research on network goods
(see for example, Besen and Farrell 1994, Katz and Shapiro 1994). However, the motivation
for consumption externality in this literature is technological, rather than social.
Our research is diﬀerent from the prior research in several important ways. First, unlike
the behavioral literature in marketing, our focus is on developing a formal utility-based model
to examine the implications of social inﬂuences on consumer demand and ﬁrms’ prices and
proﬁts. Second, in contrast to the signaling models in economics, we model snobs and
followers using a consumption externality. Third, unlike the extant literature we show that
snobs can have an upward-sloping demand curve and also examine the equilibrium prices
and proﬁts in both a monopoly and a duopoly. Fourth, we empirically demonstrate the
existence of an upward sloping demand curve for snobs. Finally, unlike prior experimental
research, we investigate both the actions and beliefs of the subjects. This enabled us to test
both the consequences as well as the assumptions of the rational expectations model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we describe our model of conspicuous
consumption in the case of a monopoly. In §3, we extend the model to consider a duopoly.
In §4, we discuss our empirical investigation. We conclude our paper in §5.
2 Model
We begin our theoretical analysis by examining a monopoly. We ﬁrst consider the case where
the market is comprised of only snobs. Next, we examine the polar case where the market
only consists of followers. Finally, we study a market that includes both snobs and followers.
There are two reasons for this sequence of analyses. First, it allows us to compare our
results with the prior literature which has primarily focused on only one of these segments
at a time. Second, this sequential approach helps us to better appreciate the impact of each
of these market segments on ﬁrm’s demands, prices and proﬁts, and also understand how the
coexistence of both these groups alters the results. In §3, we analyze the case of a duopoly
in order to understand how competition changes these results.
2.1 Monopoly: Snobs Only
First consider the case where the market consists of only snobs. Snobs value exclusivity, and
consequently the utility derived from a product depends not only on its base value, but also
on the expected number of people who will buy the product. Thus, the expected (indirect)
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utility of purchasing a product is given by:
U(x
e,p) = v − p − g(x
e) (1)
where v is the base valuation, p is the price for the product, and xe is the expected number of
buyers. Assume that g(0) = 0, g(xe) > 0 ∀xe > 0, g(1) < ∞, and g0(·) > 0. These conditions
ensure that the product is less valuable as more people buy it. We assume that each consumer
only buys at most one unit of the conspicuous good at a time. This assumption is tenable for
many conspicuous goods such as cars. Suppose that v is distributed across the populations
according to a continuous distribution F(·), and normalize the total number of consumers
to 1. We assume that F(·) is common knowledge. Hence, the number of consumers who will
buy the product is given by:
x = 1 − F(p + g(x
e)) (2)
We assume that each consumer has the same expectation about the expected number of
people who will buy the product. Further, these expectations are rational, implying that
they are correct in equilibrium. Such assumptions are fairly common in the literature (see
for example Becker 1991, Katz and Shapiro 1985, Rajiv, Dutta and Dhar 2002). Therefore,
we assume that:
x − x
e = 0 (3)
Using (2) and (3) we can derive the rational expectations equilibrium. The relevant equation
is:
Λ1(x) = x − 1 + F(p + g(x)) = 0 (4)
Equation 4 implicitly describes the demand x(p) under the rational expectations condition.
We ﬁrst consider the issue of existence and uniqueness of x(p).
Lemma 1 There exists a unique and stable rational expectations equilibrium that satisﬁes
(4).10
Proof of all the results are in Appendix A.
10The concept of stability that we use is due to Samuelson (1983) who considers a tˆ atonnement process
and examines the stability of the linear-approximation system. This concept has been widely used in general
equilibrium theory (see for example Takayama 1985 for a discussion) and game theory (see for example
Reinganum 1985).
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Eﬀect on Slope of the Demand Curve
Let us now study how the demand curve is aﬀected by consumer’s desire for exclusivity.










1 + fg0 < 0 (5)
Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 If the market consists of snobs, then under a rational expectations equilib-
rium the demand curve is downward sloping.
In order to appreciate the intuition for this result, let us see how a unit change in price
aﬀects a consumer’s expected utility from buying the product. We have:
∂U
∂p






Note that if the consumer expects ∂xe/∂p to be negative, then for a suﬃciently large g0(·) it
is possible that the consumer’s utility is increasing in price. This outcome, however, implies
that as the price increases, the total number of consumers who will buy the product would
increase - thus giving rise to an upward sloping demand curve. Such a reasoning could
potentially form the basis of na¨ ıve intuition. Note, however, that for this intuition to be
valid it is necessary that the consumer expects the demand curve to be downward sloping.
Indeed, it is natural to form such an expectation based on every day observations in the
demand pattern of fast moving consumer goods.
Now let us examine the implications of the consumer forming rational expectation. If
utility increases with price, then demand is likely to grow with price. But from (6) we know
that if ∂xe/∂p > 0 then consumer utility must be decreasing in price, irrespective of the size
of g0(·). Thus, if consumers expect an upward sloping demand curve, the realized demand
curve would be downward sloping. Hence, such an expectation is not rational. The only
situation which is consistent with the rational expectations condition is that the expected
demand curve is downward sloping and the consumer’s utility is decreasing in price.
The arguments made above highlight the importance of rational expectations for Propo-
sition 1. If consumers’ expectations are not rational it is possible to have an upward sloping
demand curve, but not when they form rational expectations. In the empirical section, we
will examine the validity of both the rational expectations assumption and its consequences.11
11 We derived Proposition 1 using the implicit function theorem (which requires local diﬀerentiability). The
continuity assumptions were useful to prove uniqueness and existence of rational expectations equilibrium.
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Impact on Proﬁts
Now we consider the monopolist’s proﬁt and examine how it is aﬀected by the presence of
snobs. Without any loss in generality we assume that the marginal cost of the product is
zero. The proﬁt function is:
Π(p) = x(p)p (7)
We assume that the proﬁt function is concave in price, and we will focus on situations where
there is an interior solution. In order to evaluate the impact of the snobbish behavior on
prices and proﬁts, we deﬁne g(·) = λ1˜ g(·) where ˜ g(·) > 0 and ˜ g0 > 0. Thus, as λ1 increases
snobbish behavior becomes more prominent.
We have the following result:
Proposition 2 Firm’s proﬁts decrease as snobbishness increases.
It is commonly believed that manufacturers of luxury good items earn supra-normal
proﬁts, and the reason for this is intimately related to consumers’ desire for exclusivity. Our
result shows that at least in a monopoly setting with rational consumers this is not true.
To understand the reason for this result, note that as snobbishness increases, the demand
decreases. This is because each additional sale exerts a negative externality on the sale of
other units. Consequently, the ﬁrm sells less as snobbish behavior increases. On using the







Thus, ﬁrm’s proﬁts are hurt by the negative impact of snobbish behavior on the demand.
Now, let us examine how the optimal prices are impacted by snobbishness. As snobbish-
ness increases, the total demand tends to decrease. However, increase in snobbishness can
also make the consumer less price sensitive which tends to increase price. It can be seen that










The ﬁrst term on the left hand side of the above equation, represents how the demand changes
as snobbishness increases. This term is always negative. It implies that in order to sell addi-
tional units the ﬁrm needs to decrease its price more as snobbishness increases. The second
But as our discussion of the intuition using equation 6 shows, the proof would go through even if F(·) was
not continuous. Also, it is easy to see that the arguments would hold even if demand was discrete. For
example, in the empirical section we consider a discrete version of this model.
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term however tends to be positive because as the desire for exclusivity increases, consumers
usually become less price sensitive. The combined eﬀect of these two terms is ambiguous.
In the case of uniform f(·) and linear g(·) these two eﬀects completely counterbalance each
other, and the prices are independent of the degree of snobbishness! However, this is not a
general result. Note that this ambiguous result is in contrast to some claims that products
associated with desire for exclusivity would be higher priced (see for example Groth and
McDaniel 1993). These claims are sometimes based on the fact that desire for exclusivity
can make consumers less price sensitive. However, as (9) shows this eﬀect is counteracted by
the negative demand-eﬀect of snobbishness which tends to reduce price. In fact, it is easy
to construct examples, where the prices decrease as the snobbishness increases.
Taken together the results of this section show that in a monopoly setting the following
two claims may not be consistent with rational expectations: 1) snobs have an an upward
sloping demand curve, and 2) the desire for exclusivity always leads to higher prices. Also,
the results bring into question the use of some marketing strategies like limited or exclusive
distribution which are presumably designed to increase the image of exclusivity and attract
the snobs. Our results show that at least in a monopoly setting such strategies need not lead
to higher prices and could reduce ﬁrm proﬁts.
2.2 Monopoly: Followers Only
Now consider the polar case where consumers are not looking for exclusivity, but like to
follow others. The expected (indirect) utility of such a consumer is given by:
U(x
e,p) = v − p + h(x
e) (10)
where h(0) = 0,h(1) < ∞, h(·) ≥ 0 and h0 > 0. Using the approach as discussed before,
it immediately follows that the relevant equation which describes consumer demand under
rational expectations is:
Λ2(x) = x − 1 + F(p − h(x)) = 0 (11)
Next we address the issues of existence, stability and uniqueness.
Lemma 2 There exists a rational expectation equilibrium which satisﬁes (11). Furthermore,
the equilibrium is unique if and only if 1 − h0f > 0 at any equilibrium point. If there exists
a unique equilibrium, then it is also stable.
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Eﬀect on Slope of the Demand Curve







If we consider situations in which there is a unique solution then it follows that ∂x/∂p < 0.
As the lemma shows, if 1−h0f > 0 at x∗ then the solution is necessarily stable. Therefore, a
unique and stable rational expectations equilibrium would necessarily have downward sloping
demand curve. In fact, using the lemma and (12), we have the following:
Lemma 3 If there exists an equilibrium with x0(p) > 0 then there also exists another stable
equilibrium in which x0(p) < 0.
It is useful to contrast this results with that of Becker (1991) who also shows that an
upward-sloping demand curve is possible in the context of pricing of restaurant services.
However, the graphical example that he uses to depict such a possibility, involves multiple
solutions, and the equilibrium at which the demand curve is upward sloping is unstable.
Further, consistent with our results, we note that in Becker’s example there also exists a
stable equilibrium in which the demand curve is downward sloping. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 3 If the equilibrium is unique then the demand curve in the case of followers
is downward-sloping.
It is useful to understand the intuition for this result using the framework that we em-
ployed for the case of snobs. We have:
∂U
∂p






If the consumer expects ∂xe/∂p to be negative, then the consumer’s expected utility is
necessarily decreasing in price. Consequently, in this case there would exist a downward-
sloping demand curve that is consistent with expectations. But if the consumer expects
∂xe/∂p to be positive and h0(·) is large enough, then consumer’s expected utility can increase
as price rises. This implies that for large enough h0(·) the demand curve can be potentially
upward-sloping, even when we impose the rational expectations condition. However, the
uniqueness and/or stability condition imposes limits on the size of h0(·), and it turns out
that in a unique, stable equilibrium h0(·) is bounded in such a way that it rules out the
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possibility of an upward-sloping demand curve. Thus in contrast to snobs, it is possible for
followers to have an upward sloping demand curve. However, to the extent that we are likely
to observe only stable equilibria in the market, we should only observe downward-sloping
demand curve in markets characterized by follower behavior.
Impact on Proﬁts
In order to examine how conformity aﬀects ﬁrm proﬁts, let h ≡ λ2˜ h where ˜ h > 0 and ˜ h0 > 0
and λ2 is a constant. Assume that the proﬁt function is concave and consider the situation
in which there is an interior solution. We have:
Proposition 4 Proﬁts are increasing as the degree of conformity increases.
This ﬁnding is in direct contrast to the result we obtained in the case of snobs. But this
result is consistent with the observation that some ﬁrms employ marketing strategies to
create a bandwagon eﬀect for their products. Often such companies are able to charge high
prices and make higher than normal proﬁts.12 To understand the intuition note that each
additional unit that the ﬁrm sells exerts a positive externality on the sale of other units.
Consequently, as the degree of conformism increases, the total sales and thereby the total
proﬁts are higher.
Now, let us consider the impact of conformism on prices. As in the case of snobs, there
are two eﬀects that we need to consider. The ﬁrst eﬀect, is the demand-eﬀect which tends to
increase price since the value of the product increases with each additional sale. Thus, the
ﬁrm has less incentive to decrease prices. However, as in the case of snobs, there is another
eﬀect: the eﬀect of conformism on price-sensitivity. Usually, consumers tend to become more
price-sensitive as conformism increases. These two eﬀects tend to counteract each other. For
the case where we have uniform f(·) and linear h(·), the two forces balance out, and thus
conformism has no eﬀect on prices! Nevertheless, in more general cases the overall eﬀect is
ambiguous, and prices can be higher in the presence of followers.
12For example, Corneo and Jeanne (1997b) discuss the case of a French company which introduced an
object called POG which were plastic disks with little usefulness or aesthetic quality. However, with some
clever marketing campaign the company started a craze among French children for POGs. The company
sold more than 15 million POGs in a month, at a price which far exceeded the production cost.
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2.3 Monopoly: Both Snobs and Followers
So far, we have seen that the demand function for snobs is always downward sloping, while
those of followers could potentially be upward sloping. However, if there exists a unique
rational expectations equilibrium, in both cases we must have a downward sloping demand
curve. These results suggest that neither conformity nor snobbishness alone is enough to
induce an upward sloping demand curve. Now, we consider the case when the market is
comprised of two types of buyers: snobs and followers. Let the value distribution for the
followers be given by F1 and let x represent the number of followers who buy the product,
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Similarly, F2 and y are the corresponding parameters for the snobs, where
0 ≤ y ≤ 1.13 Therefore, using an approach which is consistent with the single-segment
analysis, the relevant equations are:
x = 1 − F1(p − h(x
e + y
e) (14)
y = 1 − F2(p + g(x
e + y
e)) (15)
where g(·) and h(·) are deﬁned as before except that now we require h(2) < ∞ and g(2) < ∞
since the total market potential is now normalized to 2.14
On imposing the rational expectations condition, we have the following system of equation
which deﬁnes the demand:
x − 1 + F1(p − h(x + y)) = 0 (16)
y − 1 + F2(p + g(x + y)) = 0 (17)
Next we address the issue of existence, uniqueness and stability.
Lemma 4 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium. Furthermore, if 1−h0f1 > 0 at
the equilibrium point, then the equilibrium is unique and stable.
13Note that we are assuming that the size of the snob segment is the same as that of the follower segment.
A more general model could incorporate diﬀerent segment sizes. However, this would only complicate the
presentation of the results without altering the qualitative nature of any of our results.
14An alternate formulation would be to assume that snobs dislike followers adopting the product and
therefore g(xe +ye) should be replaced by g(xe). Also, it is possible that followers look at the snobs as their
aspirational group and therefore, h(xe + ye) should be replaced by h(ye). The formulation that we have
chosen is closer to earlier single-segment analysis, and therefore is useful in highlighting how the presence of
followers aﬀects the equilibrium outcome. Further, this alternate formulation is consistent with the notion
of reference groups and less so with the notions of exclusivity and conformity, which is the main focus of
this paper. Finally, this alternate formulation would require consumers to have more precise estimates of
segmentwise demand, which may be even more diﬃcult. Nevertheless, the qualitative implications of our
results would remain unchanged if we use this alternate formulation.
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We will assume that 1 − h0f1 > 0, and therefore focus on the unique, stable rational
expectations equilibrium.
Eﬀect on Slope of the Demand Curve
Using the implicit function theorem and Lemma 4 we have the following result:
Proposition 5 At the unique, stable rational expectations equilibrium, the total demand
curve and the demand curve for the followers is downward sloping. However, the demand
curve for the snobs is upward sloping if f1(h0 + g0) > 1.15
This at least provides one potential reason as to why upward sloping demand curve seems
to be empirically associated with snobs and not with followers. This is because the demand
curve for the snobs can be upward sloping at the optimal price. But this cannot be true for the
followers. The result shows that upward-sloping demand curve is more likely to be observed
as the conformist eﬀect or the exclusivity eﬀect increases.16 That is, ∂y/∂p increases as
h0(·) or g0(·) increases. Further, the result highlights that the upward-sloping demand curve
for snobs is likely to be observed, only when the market includes a group of consumers
whose utilities do not exhibit negative consumption externality. That is, there is a group
of consumers who are (weakly) conformists. Note that our result contradicts the claim of
Liebenstein (1950) who argues that the demand curve for snobs would always be downward
sloping. Nevertheless, the result is consistent with anecdotal and empirical evidence.
We see support for our results in the study of Chao and Schor (1998). They ﬁnd that
the overall demand curve for conspicuous items like women’s cosmetics is downward sloping.
However, they ﬁnd that the demand for cosmetics like lipsticks, mascara and eyeshadow
increase with price for college educated women. To the extent that these women are more
likely to be status conscious and desire exclusivity, these results are consistent with our
theoretical results. Interestingly, the demand curve for women who have not graduated from
college is downward sloping as we would expect. Finally, they also ﬁnd that non conspicuous




−f1(1 + f2(g0 + h0))




−f2(1 − f1(h0 + g0))
1 − h0f1 + f2g0 ;
∂
∂p
(x + y) =
−(f1 + f2 + 2f1f2g0)
1 − h0f1 + f2g0
16It is however important to note that the result does not require the presence of followers. In particular,
the demand curve for snobs could be upward sloping even if h0 = 0 i.e., there exists a segment of consumers
whose utility is unaﬀected by the choices of other consumers.
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products like facial cleanser exhibit downward sloping demand curves for all segments. This
is also consistent with our results.17
Let us understand why the presence of both followers and snobs leads to a result which
is quite diﬀerent from the one we observed in the case of only snobs or only followers. Let us
ﬁrst consider a consumer who is a snob. The change in expected utility of such a consumer
with price is given by:
∂Us
∂p









If we impose the uniqueness or the stability condition, the consumer expects the total demand
curve to be downward-sloping. In such a situation, it is possible that if g0(·) is large enough,
the consumer’s expected utility is increasing in price. Consequently, under a stable rational
expectations equilibrium, we could observe an upward-sloping demand curve for the snobs.
Notice that it is the presence of followers which makes it possible for us to observe an
upward-sloping demand curve for snobs. This is because the presence of followers allows
for the possibility that the total demand decreases as price increases. This drop in demand
makes the product attractive to the snobs, and for suﬃciently large g(·), snobs are more
likely to buy the product as price increases.
Now consider the case of a consumer who is a follower. We have:
∂Uf
∂p









It is clear that if the consumer expects the total demand curve to be downward sloping, then
the consumer’s expected utility is decreasing in price, regardless of h(·). Consequently, the
demand curve for the followers is downward sloping.
Impact on Proﬁts
Now, let us examine how ﬁrm’s proﬁts are impacted by the behavior of followers and snobs.
Let g ≡ λ1˜ g and h ≡ λ2˜ h, and assume that the proﬁt functions are concave. We focus on
the case with an interior solution. We have the following result:
Proposition 6 Firms’s proﬁts are always decreasing in snobbishness and increasing in con-
formism.
17For example, the price coeﬃcient for lipsticks, equals -0.19 for women with high school diploma. But
for women with college degree the price coeﬃcient is +0.117. However, the overall price coeﬃcient is -0.157.
Chao and Schor (1998) also ﬁnd that the correlation between quality and price in this category is zero.
Therefore, price could not be a credible signal of quality in this case. Similar results were also observed in
the case of mascara and eyeshadow.
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The result is consistent with those obtained in the pure snobs and pure follower cases and the
intuition is similar. Again, the eﬀect of snobbishness and conformism on prices is ambiguous,
as the demand eﬀect and the price-sensitivity eﬀect tend to counteract each other. In the
next section, we will examine how competition aﬀects this result.
3 Competition
We now consider the case of a duopoly and examine how the presence of snobs and followers
aﬀects the demand equations and also the equilibrium prices. We model competition by
assuming that there are two symmetric ﬁrms located on the two ends of a Hotelling line.
Our assumption of symmetry allows us to focus on the impact of exclusivity and conformity
on demand, prices and proﬁts, while ruling out product quality diﬀerences as a potential
explanation for the equilibrium outcomes. We allow for two segments of consumers: followers
and snobs, each with unit demand. The expected utility that a follower located at θ receives
from buying ﬁrm 1’s product is:
U
f




1) − t1θ − p1 (20)
where h(·) is the conformity function, h(·) > 0,h0(·) > 0, p1 is the price for Product 1, v is
the base valuation and t1 represents the psychological cost of moving from one’s ideal point.
Finally, xe
1 and ye
1 are the consumer’s expectation of the number of followers and snobs who








2) − t1(1 − θ) − p2 (21)






2) − p1 + p2
2t1
(22)
We assume that v is suﬃciently high so that the consumer will buy one of the two products.
This assumption, which is fairly common in models using the Hotelling framework, allows
the market to be fully served (see for example, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000). Let F1(·) be
the value distribution for followers. Then the number of followers who will buy product 1 is
given by:
x1 = F1(θf) (23)
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For the consumer who is a snob the utility of buying Product 1 is given by:
U
s




1) − t2θ − p1 (24)
where g(·) is the snob function, g(·) > 0,g0(·) > 0 and t2 represents the disutility of moving
from one’s ideal point. We allow for the possibility that followers and snobs could potentially
have diﬀerent strength of preferences. In other words, t1 and t2 could be diﬀerent. The
expected utility that a snob receives from purchasing Product 2 is given by:
U
s




2) − t2(1 − θ) − p2 (25)







2) − p1 + p2
2t2
(26)
Let F2(·) be the value distribution for snobs. Then the number of snobs who will buy
Product 1 is given by:
y1 = F2(θs) (27)
The rational expectations conditions are:
x
e
1 = x1 (28)
y
e
1 = y1 (29)
Equations (23), (27), (28) and (29) describe the rational expectations equilibrium. The
following result addresses the issue of existence, uniqueness and stability.
Lemma 5 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium. Furthermore, if g(·) and h(·)
are linear and f1h0
1/t1 < 1 where h0
1 = h0(x1 + y1) then the equilibrium is unique and stable.
Note that the condition included in the lemma is similar to the one used in the monopoly
case. We will assume that the conditions assumed in the lemma for uniqueness and stability
hold.
Own Price and Cross Price Eﬀects
Using the implicit function theorem we have the following result:
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Proposition 7 If conditions of Lemma 5 hold, then the demand curve for followers and
the total demand curve is downward sloping in own price. However, the demand curve for
snobs are upward sloping in own price if f1(g0
1 + h0
1) > t1. Furthermore, ∂x1/∂p2 > 0 and
∂(x1 + y1)/∂p2 > 0 while ∂y1/∂p2 < 0 if f1(g0
1 + h0
1) > t1 where g0
1 = g0(x1 + y1) and
h0
1 = h0(x1 + y1).18
This result is consistent with the ﬁnding in the monopoly case, and the intuition is similar.
This result highlights that, when the snob eﬀect is large enough, a decrease in price by a
ﬁrm can increase the demand from snobs for its competitor’s product.
Impact on Prices and Proﬁts
Now, we can examine the competitive situation in which both ﬁrms independently choose
prices. We look for pure strategy Nash equilibrium prices. In the following lemma, we have
the conditions that ensure existence, uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6 If f1 and f2 are uniform and the conditions of Lemma 5 hold, then there exists
a unique, symmetric and stable pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices.
The assumption that f1 and f2 are uniform is suﬃcient for the existence of a unique equi-
librium, though not necessary.19 Nevertheless, these conditions make the comparative static
analysis easier. In our model, we allow f1 and f2 to be diﬀerent. In other words, we allow
for the possibility that the distribution of valuation for followers and snobs could diﬀer. For
example, we allow for the possibility that snobs have a higher base valuation for the prod-
ucts than followers or vice-versa. With this setup, we can now examine how the equilibrium
proﬁts and prices are aﬀected by snobbishness and conformity. Using an approach similar
to the monopolist case we have:
Proposition 8 The equilibrium prices and proﬁts are decreasing in conformity and increas-
ing in snobbishness.








































where: |J| = 1 + f2g0
1/t2 − f1h0
1/t1.
19For example, a weaker condition which ensures that the solutions are unique and stable is that
|∂2Π/∂p2
i| > |∂2Πi/∂pi∂pj| and ∂2Π/∂p2
i < 0. Intuitively, these conditions require that the proﬁt func-
tions are concave and that own price eﬀects are stronger than cross price eﬀects. Such conditions on the
reduced form proﬁt functions hold for a wide variety of models.
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This result is in direct contrast to the ﬁnding in the monopoly case. It is commonly believed
that exclusive products are likely to be more expensive. Our results establish the conditions
under which this common belief might hold. In contrast to the monopoly case, we ﬁnd
that in the presence of competition snobbish behavior leads to higher proﬁts. This result
provides some justiﬁcation for the use of marketing strategies which are intended to create
an exclusive image for a product.
The reason for this result can be understood by noting how conformity and snobbishness
change the complexion of competition. First, consider the case of conformity. As the number
of consumers who buy Product 1 increases, the value of the product increases for the followers
and therefore the relative value of Product 2 decreases. This implies that a unit reduction
in price by ﬁrm 1 aﬀects its total demand in two ways. First, since ﬁrm 1’s product becomes
relatively more attractive than ﬁrm 2’s product, the demand for Product 1 increases. Second,
as the consumers can rationally expect the demand for Product 1 to increase, the value of
the product for the followers increases, and therefore consumers ﬁnd it even more attractive
to buy Product 1. Thus, as the degree of conformity increases, ﬁrms are lured to cut prices.
The ensuing price competition causes the equilibrium prices to drop.
It is also useful to understand why this result is in contrast to the observations in the
monopoly case. In the monopoly situation, the ﬁrm is trying to attract the marginal con-
sumer who is indiﬀerent between buying and not buying. The value of the outside good is
ﬁxed at zero. Consequently, as the conformity increases the value of the product increases,
enabling the ﬁrm to extract a higher surplus from the consumers. However, in the case
of competition, consumers retain some surplus and the value of an outside option for the
consumers is not ﬁxed (since both ﬁrms are strategic). Thus, while conformism increases
consumer utility and helps them draw more surplus, it encourages more intense competition
to attract consumers and consequently hurts ﬁrms.
Now, let us consider the case when the degree of snobbishness in the market increases.
As consumers become more snobbish, if ﬁrm 1 decreases its prices it expects to get more
consumers. However, this increase in demand reduces the value of the product for the snobs,
and they are less likely to buy the product. Therefore, as the degree of snobbishness increases,
reducing prices becomes less attractive to both the ﬁrms. The consequent reduction in price
competition helps ﬁrms to charge higher prices and make more proﬁts.
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Let us now examine how changes in t1 and t2 aﬀect the equilibrium prices and proﬁts.
We have:
Proposition 9 As t1 increases, equilibrium prices and proﬁts are increasing. However, if
f1(g0
1 + h0
1) > t1 then equilibrium prices and proﬁts are decreasing in t2.
The parameter ti moderates the impact of price on consumer’s demand for the products.
In the usual case, an increase in ti can be interpreted as equivalent to a decrease in price-
sensitivity.20 Therefore, the ﬁrst part of the proposition implies that as price sensitivity
among followers reduces, ﬁrms’ prices and proﬁts increase. This makes intuitive sense.
However, surprisingly this result does not always hold for the case of snobs. As the
second part of the proposition implies, when the snob eﬀect is large enough, an increase in
t2 can actually reduce prices and proﬁts. To understand this result, ﬁrst note that under
the condition speciﬁed in the proposition the demand curve for snobs is upward sloping. In
this case, as t2 increases snobs become more price sensitive.21 Therefore, if the snob eﬀect
is large enough, an increase in t2 intensiﬁes the price competition. Consequently, in such a
case both ﬁrms charge lower prices and make lower proﬁts.
The parameter ti can also be interpreted as the degree of perceived functional diﬀer-
ences between the product (see Iyer and Soberman 2000). In particular, as ti increases the
perceived functional diﬀerences between products increases.22 Hence, the above proposition
implies that while promoting conspicuous goods to snobs, managers should be cautious in
stressing functional diﬀerences between the products. Rather a more proﬁtable strategy
may be to promote the exclusivity of their products. This is consistent with the observed
advertising for goods ranging from perfumes to luxury cars.

















< 0 since the
demand curve is downward sloping.
















< 0. The reason for the diﬀerence in impact on price-sensitivity is due to the fact that now
the demand curve is upward sloping. See Appendix A for formal proofs.
22To see this, note that in the absence of price diﬀerences and social considerations, as t increases, a
consumer’s strength of preference for the product that is closer to his ideal point, increases. Therefore,
consumers ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to switch from their preferred product as t increases. In other words, as t
increases the degree of perceived functional diﬀerences between two products increases.
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4 Empirical Investigation
The theoretical analysis makes an important prediction: snobs might actually buy more if
the price is higher – implying that the demand curve could be upward sloping. This result
depends on individuals forming rational expectations. With little reﬂection, we can see that
it is not easy for individuals to form correct expectations: the expectations that shaped
the decisions of individuals should be identical with ensuing aggregate behavior. Indeed,
the current evidence on rational expectations is mixed. Studies comparing forecasts made
by subjects of stochastic variables against the actual outcomes suggest that people might
not be good at forming rational expectations (Schmalansee 1976, Garner 1982, Williams
1987, Smith et al. 1988). However, there is also some evidence which supports the rational
expectations model. For example, experimental assets markets seem to converge toward
the predictions of rational expectations equilibria (see Sunder 1995 for a survey). However,
in these markets the beliefs that guided actions were not tracked. Consequently, we have
no knowledge of expectations in these markets. It is also not clear whether the results of
asset market studies are generalizable to retail markets, which are generally less eﬃcient
(Smith 1982 and Holt 1995). Thus it would be useful to test our model in a laboratory
setting, where we can track both actions and expectations. Such an investigation will add
to our understanding of the rational expectations model of conspicuous consumption, over
and above the support we see in the empirical study of Chao and Shor (1998).
The empirical work addresses two key questions:
1. Do snobs buy more as price increases? In our laboratory test, snobs purchased more
when price was increased. We ﬁrst tested for this demand pattern in a monopoly
where the market comprised of both snobs and followers. The results are consistent
with the model predictions. Later we tested the model prediction in a more complex
decision making context, where subjects have to choose between two alternative prod-
ucts. Again, the market comprised of both snobs and followers. The results of the
duopoly are also in keeping with the model prediction. In addition to ﬁnding strong
support for the qualitative predictions of the model, we have moderate support for the
point predictions. Relatedly, theory predicts that the demand curves for followers and
the total market should be down sloping, and we also ﬁnd support for this claim.
2. Are the expectations of subjects consistent with the rational expectations model? Prior
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experimental literature has not attempted to explore whether the beliefs of economic
agents conform to rational expectations model. Thus, an answer to this question
is a useful addition to our knowledge of behavior in games. We tracked the beliefs
that guided the purchase decisions of subjects in every trial of the experiment. On
average, the expected demand is consistent with the actual demand and the rational
expectations equilibrium predictions. It is useful to note that we observe variations
in the behavior of individual behavior, implying that the model prediction survives at
the aggregate level rather than the individual level.23
The experimental investigation is presented in two parts. Study 1 examines the behavior
of subjects in a monopoly setting. Whereas, Study 2 tests the model predictions in a more
complex duopoly setting.
4.1 Study 1: Monopoly
Empirical Model Our analytical model assumes continuous distribution in values. It is
diﬃcult to validate such a model in a laboratory setting with a small sample of subjects.
However the analytical results do not crucially depend on the continuity assumption as can
be seen in the discussion of the intuition for the results and footnote 11. Hence, we use a
discrete distribution of valuations. As expected, the results using this discrete distribution
are similar to those for a continuous distribution. The principal advantage of this discrete
distribution is that it is testable with a population of twenty subjects. The approach of
testing a continuous model using a discrete version is common in experimental economics
(e.g., Smith 1982). Table 1 presents the distribution of valuations for ten snobs (labeled
Type A buyers in our experiment) and ten followers (Type B buyers in our experiment).24
We used g(z) = 0.5z and h(z) = 0.6z. The resulting equilibrium demands for the snobs, the
followers and the total market are shown in Figure 1. We see that the demand curve for
snobs is (weakly) upward sloping, while it is (weakly) downward sloping for followers and the
total market. In our experiment, we use two price points to trace the slope of the demand
curve.
23Similar observation has been made in several experimental games (e.g., ONeill 1987, Rapoport and
Boebel 1992).
24We named the two types of buyers as Type A and Type B buyers, rather than as snobs and followers,
so that the behavior of subjects is purely guided by the negative and positively externality captured in our
model.
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–Insert Table 1 –
–Insert Fig. 1 –
Subjects. The subjects who participated in the experiment were business school stu-
dents. They were paid a show-up fee of $5 in addition to monetary reward contingent on
their performance. All transactions were in an experimental currency called “francs” that
were converted into US dollars at the end of the experiment.
Experimental Design. We used a within-subject design with two levels of prices: 5.9
and 6.9 francs. Using these two price points we trace the changes in demand among snobs
and followers. We ran two groups comprised of twenty subjects each. In Group 1 the price
was low in the ﬁrst thirty trials and high in the next thirty trials. In Group 2 the order of
price presentation was reversed.
Procedure. In our experiment subjects played the role of buyers, while the computer
played the role of seller. The instructions that we provided to the subjects are in Appendix
B. In keeping with the spirit of the complete information theoretical model, subjects were
informed of g(z), h(z), and the value distribution.
Seller: We simulated the retail market environment, where a seller posts price and
promises to supply its product to all buyers who are willing to pay the posted price (see
Smith 1982 and Holt 1995 for a discussion on posted prices market, and its implications for
market eﬃciency). In this posted-price market, buyers cannot negotiate the price with the
seller.
Buyers: Each subject was randomly assigned to play the role of either a Type A or
Type B buyer.
Type A buyers: Type A buyers value the product less, when more people own the prod-
uct. Consequently, the actual value of the product systematically drops below the base
value when more people choose to buy the product. For example, consider the Type A
buyer whose base valuation for the product is 9.5 francs. If a total of ﬁve Type A and Type
B buyers purchase the product, the actual value of the product will fall to 7 francs (that is,
9.5 − 0.5 × 5 = 7).
Type B buyers: The Type B buyers value the product more, when more people own the
product. Hence, the actual value of the product rises above the base value when more people
choose to buy the product. For example, consider the Type B buyer whose base valuation
is 2 francs. If a total of ﬁve Type A and Type B buyers purchase the product, the actual
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value of the product will increase to 5 francs (that is, 2 + 0.6 × 5 = 5).
At the commencement of each trial, subjects were endowed with 7 francs so that they
have suﬃcient funds to pay for the product if the decide to buy it. Consistent with our
theoretical model, subjects were informed of their valuation, the distribution of valuations
and the price of the product. The type of a subject, the total number of subjects, and the
base valuations remained ﬁxed in all trials.
In every trial, each subject had to decide whether or not to purchase the product. Sub-
jects were asked to provide demand projections. Then using these demand projections, the
computer showed the expected value of the product. Subjects could revise their demand pro-
jections, and obtain new estimates of the likely value of the product. We used the demand
projections to track the expectations that guide the decisions of the subjects.
After all the buyers made their decisions, the computer counted the total number of
subjects who purchased the product. Then based on the total number of subjects who
bought the product, the actual value of the product for each subject was assessed. The
payoﬀ to a subject who bought the product is: endowment + actual value of the product
- price paid. The subjects who did not buy the product kept the endowment. At the end
of every trial, each subject was informed of the number of Type A and Type B buyers who
purchased the product, and the payoﬀ for the trial.
In order to make subjects familiar with the structure of the game, they were allowed to
play three practice trials for which they received no monetary reward. After thirty trials of
the game, the price of the product was changed. At the end of sixty trials, the experiment
concluded. Then subjects were paid according to their cumulative earnings, debriefed, and
dismissed.
4.1.1 Results.
In this section we assess the descriptive power of the rational expectations equilibrium. We
begin our analyses by examining the quantity demanded by snobs and followers. Thereafter,
we investigate the expectations that could have guided the behavior of our subjects. Overall,
the experimental results are consistent with the qualitative predictions of the model. We
observe an upward-sloping demand curve for Type A buyers (snobs), and a downward-sloping
demand curve for Type B buyers. On average, the expected demand is also consistent with
the rational expectations equilibrium solution. However, we see variations in the beliefs and
actions of individual subjects.
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Analysis of Demand. Table 2 presents the mean quantity demanded by the two types
of buyers, and the corresponding equilibrium predictions. The empirical results are consistent
with the qualitative predictions of the equilibrium solution. However, we see some departures
from the point predictions of model. Also, there is a signiﬁcant trend in the demand pattern
over the several iterations of the game.
Qualitative Predictions. The model makes four qualitative predictions. First, in theory
the demand for the product among Type A buyers (snobs) should grow as the price increases.
The average demand was 1.53 units, when the product was priced 5.9 francs. But when
the price increased to 6.9 francs, the demand rose to 3.57 units. We can reject the null
hypothesis that these demand levels are the same (F(1,118) = 92.83,p < 0.0001). We obtain
similar results in each of the two groups. In Group 1, the average demand grew from 1.33 to
3.43 units, as the price rose from 5.9 to 6.9 francs, and this diﬀerence in demand is signiﬁcant
(F(1,58) = 94.25,p < 0.0001). In Group 2, the mean demand correspondingly increased from
1.93 to 3.7 units (F(1,58) = 27.66,p < 0.0001).
Second, in equilibrium the followers should demand less as the price increases. In ac-
tuality, the average demand of Type B buyers across the two groups declined from 9.12 to
3.08 units, when the price rose from 5.9 to 6.9 francs. This shift in demand is signiﬁcant
(F(1,118) = 573.31,p < 0.0001). We see similar results at the level of individual groups.
In Group 1, on average the demand dropped from 9.03 to 2.9 units (F(1,58) = 749.48,p <
0.0001). In Group 2 the demand declined from 9.2 to 3.26 units, as the price increased
(F(1,58) = 171,p < 0.0001).
Third, the model predicts that the overall demand should fall as price increases. The
mean actual demand dropped from 10.65 to 6.65 units, when price rose from 6.9 to 5.9.
This change in average demand is signiﬁcant (F(1,118) = 199.93,p < 0.0001). We obtain
similar results in each of the two groups (Group 1: F(1,58) = 134.81,p < 0.0001; Group 2:
F(1,58) = 89.67,p < 0.0001).
Fourth, when the price is 5.9 francs, followers should demand the product more than
snobs. Consistent with this prediction, the followers demanded on the average 9.12 units
across both groups. On average, snobs demanded only 1.53 units. A paired comparison of
the units demanded by snobs and followers reveals that the observed diﬀerence in demands
is signiﬁcant (t = 42.15,p < 0.0001). We observe similar results in both Group 1 and Group
2. In Group 1, the average demand of followers was 9.03, and it is more than the 1.13 units
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demanded by snobs (t = 45.10,p < 0.0001). In Group 2, the followers and snobs bought on
the average 9.2 and 1.93 units, respectively (t = 23.69,p < 0.0001).
Finally, when the price is 6.9 francs, snobs should demand more than followers. On
average across the two groups, snobs and followers bought 3.56 and 3.08 units, respectively.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that these quantities are the same (t = 1.5,p > 0.13).
On closer examination, we note that the diﬀerence in demand is marginally signiﬁcant in
Group 1, but not in Group 2. In Group 1, the mean quantity purchased by snobs and
followers is 3.43 and 2.9 units, respectively (t = 1.97,p < 0.058). Whereas in Group 2, snobs
and followers purchased 3.7 and 3.26 units (t = 0.73,p > 0.2).
–Insert Table 2 –
Distribution of Demand. The equilibrium solution provides unique point predictions about
demand. But the actual demand varies over the several trials of the experiment. Fig 2
presents the empirical distribution of demand for the product among snobs and followers.
The model predicts that if the price is 5.9 francs, then one snob should buy the product.
Over the sixty trials across the two groups, the actual quantity demanded ranges from 0 to
4, with mean = 1.53,median = 2, and mode = 2. But if the price rises to 6.9 francs, then in
theory four snobs should buy the product. We observe that the actual demand ranges from
1 to 6, with mean = 3.56, median = 4, and mode = 4.
In equilibrium, the followers should demand ten units when the price is 5.9 francs. The
actual demand ranged from 7 to 10 units, with mean = 9.11, median = 9, and mode = 9.
If the price is increased to 6.9 francs, then in theory the demand should drop to 2 units.
The observed demand ranged from 0 to 8 units, with mean = 3.08, median = 3, and
mode = 2. This suggests that, though the observed behavior is consistent with the qualitative
predictions of the model, there are departures from the point predictions of the equilibrium
solution.
–Insert Fig. 2 –
Trends in Demand. In the analyses discussed above we have aggregated the demand
across groups and trials, and it could mask the trends in demand. In Fig. 3 we present
the moving average for blocks of ﬁve trials. These block means were computed across the
two groups. Statistical analysis of the block means suggests that followers evince signiﬁcant
trend in demand, when the price was 6.9 francs (F(5,20) = 9.76,p < 0.0001), but only a
marginal trend when the price was 5.9 francs (F(5,20) = 2.34,p < 0.08). The trends in
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the demand pattern of snobs is much weaker. It is marginally signiﬁcant at 6.9 francs
(F(5,20) = 2.87,p < 0.05), and not signiﬁcant at 5.9 francs (p < 0.2). This suggests that we
observe some learning in the experiment although it seems to be very weak in some cases.
–Insert Fig. 3 –
Variation by Valuation. Whether or not a subject buys the product depends on her base
valuation and the expected number of people likely to buy the product. In equilibrium,
each player should play a pure strategy, and it changes with the base value of the product.
For instance, when the price is 5.9 francs then only the Type A buyer with a base value
of 11.4 francs should buy the product. All others should not buy the product. On the
other hand, when price is 6.9 francs, then only the Type A buyers with the four top base
valuations should buy the product. Fig. 4 presents the number of trials in which the diﬀerent
Type A buyers purchased the product. The players are arranged in the ascending order of
their base valuations. Hence, player 1 has the lowest base valuation, and player 10 has the
highest valuation. We see that subjects did not always play the predicted strategies. Yet the
aggregate behavior is directionally consistent with the model prediction. We observe similar
behavior among Type B buyers as well.
–Insert Fig. 4 –
Analysis of Expectations. Thus far we have examined how the purchase behavior
conforms to the rational expectations equilibrium solution. In every trial of the experiment,
we asked subjects to guess the likely number of Type A and Type B buyers who might
purchase the product. Now using these demand projections, we can explore whether the
expectations of our subjects are consistent with the outcomes and the equilibrium solution.
Table 3 presents the mean expected demand, along with the rational expectations equilibrium
solution.25 It is reassuring to observe that the expected demand is in keeping with the
observed outcomes and the qualitative predictions of the model. But there is a wide variation
in expectations. Further, we discern a trend in the expectation over the several trials of the
game.
Qualitative Predictions. In keeping with the theory, our subjects expected snobs to buy
more when the price was high. Across the two groups, the mean expected demand of
snobs increased from 1.63 to 3.38 units as the price rose from 5.9 to 6.9 francs (F(1,2398) =
853.65,p < 0.0001). On the other hand, followers were expected to buy less as the price
25Each subject forecast the number of Type A and Type B buyers who will purchase the product. The
mean expected demand is computed by averaging the expectations of all the subjects.
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rose. The average expected demand dropped from 8.08 to 3.52 units as the price increased
(F(1,2398) = 2126.39,p < 0.0001). The changes in expected demand follow a similar pattern
within each group. Finally, consistent with theory, the mean aggregate demand was expected
to drop as price increased (F(1,2398) = 554.01,p < 0.0001). The results are similar within
each group.
The model assumes that expectations are correct. That is, the actual demand and
the expected demand are the same. Indeed, the mean observed demand and the expected
demands are similar. When the price was 6.9 francs, the average actual and expected total
demand were 6.65 and 6.89 units, respectively. We can not reject the null hypothesis that
these demands are the same (t = 0.11,p > 0.2). When the price dropped to 5.9 francs, the
actual and expected demand were on average 8.45 and 9.11 units, respectively. Again, we
can not reject the null hypothesis that these demands are the same (t = 0.39,p > 0.2).
Distribution of Expectations. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of expected demand across
the two groups. In equilibrium, one snob should buy if the price is 5.9 francs. The expec-
tations range from 0 to 10, with mean = 1.63, median = 1 and mode = 1. In theory, the
demand should be four units, if the price is increased to 6.9 francs. We note that the expec-
tations range from 0 to 10, with mean = 3.38, median = 3, and mode = 4. Thus, though
the expectations vary widely, they conform to the qualitative predictions of the model.
–Insert Fig. 5 –
Our subjects expected all the way from none to all the followers to buy the product
at both prices. Yet, as before, the distributions of expectations is qualitatively consistent
with the equilibrium solution. If price is 5.9 all followers should buy. The corresponding
expectations followed a distribution with mean = 8.86, median = 9, mode = 9. But if
the price is 6.9 then two followers should buy. The expectations were distributed with
mean = 3.51, median = 3, and mode = 3.
Trends in Expectations. Fig. 6 traces the trend in expected demand over blocks of ﬁve
trials. An analysis of variance suggests that the block means are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for
snobs (Price = 5.9: F(5,780) = 66.79,p < 0.001; Price= 6.9: F(5,780) = 4.35,p < 0.001). The
results are similar with followers.
Study 1 shows that the behavior of ﬁnancially motivated individuals is directionally
consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations equilibrium. However, we see
variations in the demand from trial to trial as well from player to player. Further, the beliefs
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of our subjects are qualitatively consistent with the observed outcomes and the equilibrium
predictions.
4.2 Study 2: Duopoly
Empirical Model.
As in Study 1, we developed a discrete version of our theoretical model so that it is
testable with a population of 20 subjects. The valuations for snobs (Type A buyers) and
followers (Type B buyers) for each of the two products is presented in Table 4. We used
g(z) = 0.5z and h(z) = 0.6z. The resulting equilibrium demands for snobs, followers and
the total market are presented in Figure 7. It is easy to see that the demand curve for
snobs is upward sloping for some range whereas the demand curve for followers and the total
market is always downward sloping. As in Study 1, we will trace the demand curves using
two price-points.
– Insert Table 4 –
–Insert Fig. 7–
Subjects. A fresh set of forty students were recruited for this study. As in Study
1, all the subjects were business school students. They were paid a show-up fee of $5 in
addition to monetary reward contingent on their performance. On average subjects earned
approximately $15.
Experimental Design. In this experiment there are two sellers with each selling a
diﬀerent product. Like before, our goal was to trace the changes in demand among snobs
and followers. Therefore, we considered two diﬀerent price points for Product 1, but kept
the price of Product 2 constant at 6 francs. We manipulated the prices within-subject. In
each session of the experiment ten subjects labeled Type A buyers played the role of snobs.
Another another set of ten subjects labeled Type B buyers played the role of followers. We
ran two groups comprised of twenty subjects each. In Group 1 the price of Product 1 was 5
francs in the ﬁrst thirty trials and 7 francs in the next thirty trials. In Group 2, we reversed
the order of prices.
Procedure. The procedure for this experiment closely follows the structure discussed
in Study 1, except that now buyers have to choose among two products. The instructions
that we provided to the subjects are in Appendix C.
Seller. Seller 1 sells Product 1, while Seller 2 sells Product 2. These sellers post their
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prices, and promise to supply the products to all buyers who are willing to pay the posted
prices. The buyers cannot negotiate the price with the sellers, and the computer played the
role of sellers. As in Study 1, the computer played the role of sellers.
Buyers. Each subject had to decide whether to buy Product 1 or Product 2. The Type
A buyers are the snobs, whereas the Type B buyers are the followers.
Type A buyers. Each buyer has a base value for Product 1 and another base value
for Product 2, and these base values remained ﬁxed throughout the experiment. The base
values for Product 1 and Product 2 are as discussed in the empirical model. The base values
were not the same for all buyers. Further, the base values for Product 1 and 2 were diﬀerent
for the same subject. Type A buyers value the product less when more people own the
product. Consequently, the actual value of the product systematically drops below the base
value when more people choose to buy the product.26
Type B buyers. Type B buyers value the product more when more people own the
product. Thus, the actual value of the product rises above the base value when more people
choose to buy the product.27
At the commencement of each trial, subjects were endowed with 7 francs so that they
have suﬃcient funds to pay for the product if they want to buy it. Besides, they were
informed of their valuations for the two products, the distribution of valuations and the
price of the products. The type of a subject, the total number of subjects, and the base
valuations remained ﬁxed in all trials.
In every trial, each subject had to decide whether to buy Product 1 or Product 2. Subjects
26For example, consider the purchase decision of Type A buyer 2 whose base value for Product 1 is 21.5 and
the base value for Product 2 is 18.5 francs. Let the price of Product 1 be 5 francs, and that of Product 2 be 6
francs. If only a total of 11 Type A and Type B buyers purchase Product 1, the actual value of the product
will fall to 16.5 francs (that is, 21.5 − 0.5 × 11 = 16). Consequently, the net gain from purchasing Product
1 is 11 francs (actual value-price = 16 − 5 = 11). On the other hand, as total of 9 (that is, 20 − 11 = 9)
Type A and Type B buyers are purchasing Product 2, the actual value of that product is 15.5 francs for this
particular buyer (that is, 18.5 − 0.5 × 9 = 14). Therefore, on purchasing Product 2 this buyer would gain 8
francs (actual value-price = 14 − 6 = 8). In this case it is proﬁtable for the buyer to purchase Product 1.
Note the actual value of a product changes with the total numbers of people purchasing that product.
27For example, consider the purchase decision of Type B buyer 9 whose base value for Product 1 is 18.4 and
the base value for Product 2 is 21.6 francs. Let the price of Product 1 be 5 francs, and that of Product 2 be 6
francs. If only a total of 11 Type A and Type B buyers purchase Product 1, the actual value of the product
will rise to 28 francs (that is, 18.4 + 0.6 × 11 = 25). Consequently, the net gain from purchasing Product
1 is 20 francs (actual value-price = 25 − 5 = 20). On the other hand, as total of 9 (that is, 20 − 11 = 9)
Type A and Type B buyers are purchasing Product 2, the actual value of that product is 27 francs for this
particular buyer (that is, 21.6+0.6×9 = 27). Therefore, on purchasing Product 2 this buyer would gain 21
francs (actual value-price = 27 − 6 = 21). Thus it is proﬁtable for this buyer to purchase Product 2. Note
the actual value of a product changes with the total numbers of people purchasing that product.
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were asked to provide demand projections. Then using these forecasts, the computer showed
the expected value of the products. Subject could revise their demand projections, and
obtain new estimates of the likely value of the products. We used the demand projections
to track the beliefs of our subjects.
After all the buyers have made the decisions, the computer counted the total number
of subjects who purchased Product 1 and Product 2. Then based on the total number of
subjects who bought these products, the actual values of the products for each subject was
assessed. The payoﬀ to a subject who bought a product is: endowment + actual value of
the product - price paid. At the end of every trial, each subject was informed of the number
of Type A and Type B buyers who purchased the product, and the payoﬀ for the trial.
To familiarize subjects with the structure of the game they were allowed to play in three
practice trials. Thereafter, they played sixty actual trials. After thirty actual trials of the
game, the price of the Product 1 was changed. At the end of the experiment, the subjects
were paid according to their cumulative earnings, debriefed, and dismissed.
4.2.1 Results.
We ﬁrst examine the demand for Product 1 among snobs and followers. Then we investigate
the expectations that could have inﬂuenced the observed patterns in demand. We observe
in this study an upward-sloping demand curve for Type A buyers (snobs), and a downward-
sloping demand curve for Type B buyers. Further, the mean expected demand is also
consistent with the equilibrium solution. However, we see individual-level diﬀerences in the
beliefs and actions of subjects.
Analysis of Demand. Table 5 presents the mean observed demand in each of the two
groups, along with the corresponding theoretical predictions.
Qualitative Predictions. As predicted by theory, the snobs purchased more Product 1
as price increased. The mean demand of Type A buyers grew from 3.93 to 5.53 units,
as the price rose from 5 to 7 francs. This change in demand for Product 1 is signiﬁcant
(F(1,118) = 36.74,p < 0.0001). When we examine the behavior within each group, we obtain
similar results. In Group 1, the average demand for Product 1 shifted from 4.07 to 5.63 units
among Type A buyers (F(1,58) = 14.95,p < 0.001). In Group 2, the corresponding demand
increased from 3.8 to 5.43 units (F(1,58) = 22.72,p < 0.001).
–Insert Table 5 –
According to theory, followers should buy less if the price increased. Across the two
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groups, the mean demand signiﬁcantly dropped from 7.6 to 2.92 units as the price changed
from 5 to 7 francs (F(1,118) = 265.02,p < 0.0001). The fall in demand is signiﬁcant in each
of the two groups. In Group 1 the mean demand slipped from 8.77 to 3.4 units (F(1,58) =
218.71,p < 0.001), and correspondingly in Group 2 the mean demand fell from 6.43 to 2.43
units (F(1,58) = 168.25,p < 0.001).
In equilibrium, the overall demand should fall as price increases. The observed demand
pattern is consistent with this prediction (F(1,118) = 90.04,p < 0.0001). We obtain similar
results in each of the two groups (Group 1: F(1,58) = 91.61,p < 0.0001; Group 2: F(1,58) =
42.44,p < 0.0001).
If the price is 7 francs, more snobs should buy Product 1. Empirical evidence supports
this prediction. On average Type A buyers bought 5.53 units, whereas followers purchased
only 2.92 units (t = 8.7,p < 0.0001). If the price is 5 francs, then more followers should
purchase Product 1. At the low price, followers bought 7.6 units on average, while snobs
purchased 3.93 units (t = 11.11,p < 0.0001). The results are similar when we examine the
demand pattern within each group.
Distribution of Demand. The rational expectations equilibrium make point predictions
about the demand for Product 1 among snobs and followers. The actual demand, however,
varies over the several trials of the experiment. Fig. 8 shows the frequency distribution of
demand over the sixty trials across the two groups. In equilibrium, three snobs should buy
the product if the price is 5 francs . We notice that the actual demand for Product 1 ranges
from 1 to 7, with mean = 3.93, median = 4, and mode = 3. But if the price increases to
7 francs, theory predicts that seven snobs should buy the product. The observed demand
ranges from 2 to 8, with mean = 5.53, median = 6, and mode = 6.
According to the model, followers should demand 9 units when the price is 5 francs.
In Fig. 8, we see that the actual demand ranges from 2 to 10 units, with mean = 7.6,
median = 7.5, and mode = 6. If the price rises to 7 francs, then theory predicts that the
demand should fall to 1 unit. The actual demand ranged from 0 to 6 units, with mean = 2.91,
median = 3, and mode = 2. As in Study 1, we ﬁnd that the quantity demanded by subjects
varies widely over the several trials of the game, though the mean demands are qualitatively
consistent with equilibrium predictions.
–Insert Fig. 8 –
Trends in Demand. Fig. 9 presents the running average for blocks of ﬁve trials. We
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ﬁnd that both snobs and followers evince signiﬁcant trend in demand when the price is low
(p < 0.01), but not at the high price (p > 0.2).28 Thus, as in the monopoly case, the evidence
for learning is mixed.
–Insert Fig. 9 –
Variation by Valuation. According to theory, each player should play a pure strategy.
Fig. 10 presents the number of trials in which the diﬀerent Type A and Type B buyers
purchased the product. This graph presents the results collapsed over the two groups. We
see that individuals do not always play the same pure strategy. Yet, the overall demand
pattern is directionally consistent with the model prediction.
–Insert Fig. 10 –
Analysis of Expectations. Now we examine how well the expectations of our subjects
conforms to the equilibrium solution and the actual outcome. For this analysis, we use the
demand projections that subjects provided at the beginning of every trial. Table 6 shows the
mean expected demand and the corresponding equilibrium prediction. The mean expected
demand conforms to the qualitative predictions of the model. On closer examination, we see
much variation in the distribution of expectations. Further, the expected demand seems to
shift toward equilibrium solution over the several iterations of the game.
Qualitative Predictions. More snobs should buy Product 1, if its price rises from 5 to
7 francs. We notice that the expected demand of snobs rose from 4.45 to 5.63 units when
the price increased (F(1,2398) = 342.27,p < 0.0001). On the other hand, fewer followers
should buy Product 1 as the price increases. Indeed, the average expected demand declined
from 7.31 to 3.48 units as the price increased (F(1,2398) = 2504.73,p < 0.0001). Further,
as predicted by theory, the expected aggregate demand fell as price increased (F(1,2398) =
1001.23,p < 0.0001). The pattern of expectations within each group also follow the model
predictions.
In equilibrium, the actual demand and the expected demand should be same. We ﬁnd
support for this assumption. When the price was ﬁve francs, the actual and expected total
demand were on average 11.53 and 11.77 units. We can not reject the null hypothesis that
these demands are the same (t = 0.12,p > 0.2). On average, the actual and expected demand
were 8.45 and 9.11 units when the price was seven francs. Again, we can not reject the null
hypothesis that these demands are the same (t = 0.37,p > 0.2).
28The ANOVA results when price is 5 francs are as follows: Snobs – F(5,20) = 4.54,p < 0.01; Followers –
F(5,20) = 6.28,p < 0.01)
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Distribution of Expectations. Over the several iterations of the game, we see much varia-
tions in the expectations of individual subjects. Fig. 11 presents the distribution of expected
demand across the two groups. According to theory, three snobs should buy the product
if the price is 5 francs. We see that the expectations were distributed with mean = 4.45,
median = 4 and mode = 4. If the price is increased to 7 francs, then seven snobs should buy
the product. The reported expectations were distributed with mean = 5.62, median = 6,
and mode = 5. Similarly, the distribution of the expected demand of followers is directionally
consistent with predictions of the model.
–Insert Fig. 11 –
Trends in Expectations. Fig. 12 traces the trend in expectations over blocks of ﬁve trials.
We can visually discern trends in the expectations of our subjects. An analysis of variance
conﬁrms that the block means are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the expected demand of snobs
(Price = 5: F(5,780) = 26.80,p < 0.001; Price= 7: F(5,780) = 14.72,p < 0.001). It is interesting
to note that in ﬁrst block of trials the snobs were expected to buy more when the price was
less. But this inconsistent expectation was revised over the course of the game. The trend
in the expected demand of followers is also signiﬁcant (Price = 5: F(5,780) = 30.37,p < 0.001;
Price= 7: F(5,780) = 24.54,p < 0.001)
5 Conclusion
This paper was motivated by a desire to understand the impact of social factors on conspic-
uous consumption. Toward this goal, we developed a parsimonious model of conspicuous
consumption using the rational expectations framework. Our theoretical and empirical in-
vestigation provides useful insights on a few questions about conspicuous consumption.
1. Would consumers buy a conspicuous product more as price increases, even if the product
has neither quality diﬀerence nor signal value? We show that in a market comprised
of both snobs and followers, the demand curve of snobs could be upward sloping. But
the demand curve of followers and the total market is always downward sloping. The
intuition for this result is that snobs prefer a higher priced product if they expect
the overall demand to be lower at the higher price, and such an expectation will be
rational only if the followers have a downward-sloping demand curve. Hence, in a
market comprised of only either snobs or followers the demand curve is downward
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sloping. It is useful to note that our result does not rely on signaling either product
quality or wealth of consumers.29.
Consistent with our ﬁndings, Chao and Shor (1998) report that the demand for visible
women’s cosmetics grows as price increases in a sub-segment of the market, though
the overall demand curve has a downward slope. Moving beyond this correlational
support, we see in the laboratory study that price increase causes demand to increase
among snobs. In both monopoly and doupoly setting, subjects who value exclusivity
bought more as price increased. Our ﬁndings oﬀer a potential explanation for the
upward-sloping demand curve seen in marketing textbooks (e.g., Berkovitz et al. 2000,
Perreault and McCarthy 2000).
2. Does consumers’ desire for exclusivity or conformity lead to higher ﬁrm proﬁts? The
answer is contingent on the market structure. In a monopoly, the desire for exclusivity
hurts ﬁrm’s proﬁts, as each additional unit of sale exerts a negative externality on the
sale of the product to other snobs in the market. However, conformism improves ﬁrm
proﬁts because of its positive eﬀect on demand.
In a duopoly, the desire for exclusivity improves equilibrium proﬁts. In this case, as
the price of a product falls it attracts more buyers, and thereby makes the product
less appealing to the snobs. Thus, ﬁrms are less inclined to cut prices as snobbish-
ness increases. The resulting softening of price competition increases ﬁrm proﬁts. In
contrast, conformism encourages price competition and reduces ﬁrm proﬁts.
3. What should be the communication focus for marketing conspicuous products? Con-
trary to some of our intuition, we ﬁnd that increased perceived diﬀerentiation of con-
spicuous products might actually reduce equilibrium prices and proﬁts. Therefore, it
might be proﬁtable for managers to focus their communication eﬀorts on highlighting
the exclusivity of their products rather than the functional diﬀerences. Indeed, this
is consistent with the observed advertising for luxury products such as Ferrari and
Christian Dior.
4. What is the descriptive validity of our model of conspicuous consumption, which is
based on a rational expectations framework? To the best of our knowledge, our study
29In fact, an explanation based on signaling status cannot account for an upward-sloping demand curve
for snobs (see Corneo and Jeanne 1997a).
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is the ﬁrst to track both beliefs and outcomes in the context of a rational expectations
game. In our studies, we ﬁnd the subjects’ expectations are on average consistent with
the observed outcome and also consistent with the rational expectations equilibrium.
Thus our empirical analysis makes a useful contribution to the experimental literature
on rational expectations models.
There are several avenues for future research. In our theoretical analysis, we only con-
sidered one marketing mix variable, namely price. In practice, advertising and promotion
play an important role in marketing conspicuous products. Therefore, it would be useful
to explore how these marketing mix variables inﬂuence the demand for conspicuous goods.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate how the market structure aﬀects equilib-
rium levels of advertising and promotion for such goods. In our empirical investigation, we
found that on average the beliefs and actions of subjects were consistent with the rational
expectations equilibrium solution. However, there was substantial variation at the individual
level. Future research can examine how individuals come to conform with the theory (see
Camerer and Ho 1999 for a discussion of learning in games).
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Type B 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.55 0.7 1.5 2 2.5 3.5 5
Note: Si
j refers to Subject j of type i.
Table 2: Mean Demand – Study 1 (Monopoly)
Type A Buyers (Snobs) Type B Buyers (Followers)
Price Actual Demand Prediction Actual Demand Prediction
Group 1 Group 2 Both Group 1 Group 2 Both
5.9 1.33 1.93 1.53 1 9.03 9.2 9.12 10
6.9 3.43 3.70 3.57 4 2.90 3.26 3.08 2
Table 3: Mean Expected Demand – Study 1 (Monopoly)
Type A Buyers (Snobs) Type B Buyers (Followers)
Price Expected Demand Prediction Expected Demand Prediction
Group 1 Group 2 Both Group 1 Group 2 Both
5.9 1.40 1.86 1.63 1 8.82 7.35 8.08 10
6.9 3.56 3.20 3.38 4 3.17 3.86 3.52 2












Type A Product 1 22 21.5 21 20.4 20.2 19.8 19.6 19.2 18.8 18












Type B Product 1 23 21.4 20.8 20.4 20 19.6 19.2 18.8 18.4 17.6
Product 2 17 18.6 19.2 19.6 20 20.4 20.8 21.2 21.6 22.4
Note: Si
j refers to Subject j of type i.
Table 5: Mean Demand – Study 2 (Duopoly)
Type A Buyers (Snobs) Type B Buyers (Followers)
Price Actual Demand Prediction Actual Demand Prediction
Group 1 Group 2 Both Group 1 Group 2 Both
5 4.07 3.80 3.93 3 8.77 6.43 7.60 9
7 5.63 5.43 5.53 7 3.40 2.43 2.92 1
Table 6: Mean Expected Demand – Study 2 (Duopoly)
Type A Buyers (Snobs) Type B Buyers (Followers)
Price Expected Demand Prediction Expected Demand Prediction
Group 1 Group 2 Both Group 1 Group 2 Both
5 4.72 4.18 4.45 3 8.33 6.29 7.31 9
7 5.73 5.53 5.63 7 3.80 3.16 3.48 1
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